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Introduction
In this paper we explore what we identify 
as a deep potential relation between archi-
tecture and ethics intrinsic to design pro-
cesses. That is, we see ethics as consisting 
of a dialogue: the process of discovering, 
evaluating and contesting what is better or 
worse in any given situation, as opposed to 
the resolution of that particular situation in 
a way understood as being ethically ‘correct’ 
(however this might be defined). In this way 
we aim to position our discussion in con-
trast to works on ethics in architecture that 
have gravitated toward either professional 
responsibility; technological issues; specific 
moral issues (for example, sustainability or 
participation); or aesthetic judgement (for 
example, the debate on ornamentation). 
Through comprehending dialogue as mani-
fest in designing architecture, we understand 
architectural design as a way of doing ethics.1 
We understand the principles of dialogue 
and conversation with reference to our sepa-
rate, but related, research projects. One is 
focused on the design process—especially 
the significance of drawing—with reference 
to Pask’s conversation theory (1976) as devel-
oped by Glanville (2007) in terms of design. 
The other focuses on the ethics of design-
ing for the public realm, with reference to 
Bakhtinian dialogism as it applies to urban 
design theory and practice.2 Building on 
these sources, we focus our investigation on 
two aspects of the design process: first, the 
relation between architect and Other; and 
second, the act of drawing. Through explor-
ing these topics, we show that the design 
process is as much ethical as it is aesthetic 
(see also Findeli 1994; Leach 2005; and Till 
2009) and that consequently, in a dialogical 
conception of design, the ethical and the aes-
thetic cannot be separated from each other 
in any meaningful way. The relation between 
Kenniff, T-B and Sweeting, B 2013 There Is No Alibi in Designing: 
Responsibility and Dialogue in the Design Process. Opticon1826, (16): 1, 
pp. 1-8, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/opt.bj
ReseaRch aRtIcle
There Is No Alibi in Designing: Responsibility 
and Dialogue in the Design Process
Thomas-Bernard Kenniff* and Ben Sweeting†
* The Bartlett, UCL, UK, and Carleton University, 
Canada 
tb.kenniff@ucl.ac.uk
† University of Brighton and The Bartlett,  
UCL, UK 
r.b.sweeting@brighton.ac.uk
This paper explores a potential relation between architecture and ethics intrinsic to design 
processes when understood in terms of dialogue or conversation. We draw on separate but 
related research interests: one focused on the design process, especially the significance of 
drawing, and the other on the ethics of designing for the public realm, with reference to 
Bakhtinian dialogism. Our investigation concentrates on two aspects of the design process 
both of which can be thought of in terms of conversation – first, the relation between 
architect and Other, and second, the act of drawing. Through this, we support the idea that 
in design the ethical and the aesthetic cannot be meaningfully separated from one another. 
Instead, their relation must be understood as a dialogue in and of itself, as well as part of 
the dialogue between all participants in the design process.
MDCCCXXVI
OPTICON
Kenniff and Sweeting: There Is No Alibi in DesigningArt. 1, page 2 of 8
the ethical and the aesthetic can be under-
stood as dialogue in and of itself, as well as 
part of the dialogue between all participants 
in the design process. That is, our sense per-
ception of the world in time and space can-
not meaningfully be separated from our 
valued relationships to other human beings. 
As the idea for this article came from want-
ing to have a conversation about these con-
vergent points of our respective research 
projects, its structure reflects the idea of dia-
logue. The article’s sections thus follow the 
pattern of statement, first response, second 
response and open discussion (where both 
voices are closely intertwined).
Designer and Other
Within any design project, particularly those 
in or for the public realm, there exists a 
range of methods used by designers (often 
in conjunction with other actors like the 
municipality) to engage with the project’s 
potential and existing publics. Some of these 
are standard and institutionalised, like con-
sultation or planning applications. Some are 
less standard and depend on the main par-
ticipants’ willingness to explore alternate 
ways of developing the project, for example 
through public art projects, public exhibi-
tions, or collaborative exercises. Some meth-
ods are intrinsic to the design process and 
do not require direct engagement, includ-
ing imagining future activities; abstracting 
people to movement patterns or functional 
programmes; statistical analysis; or inventing 
personas to play out possible scenarios in the 
future space. Overall, these varying levels of 
engagement relate to historically developed 
methods like consultation, participation, 
user-centred design, collaborative work, or 
shared-authorship. These methods serve to 
balance the asymmetry of the design pro-
cess by opening it up to other people, giving 
voice to those who may have been otherwise 
excluded from the process, or challenging 
the monologic authority and certainty of a 
single voice.
In order to concentrate on defining the 
relationship between designer and Other in 
its broadest terms, we start with the simplest 
question: what takes place when someone 
designs for somebody else? More specifically, 
what sort of responsibility is at play in the 
act of designing for the Other? We capitalise 
Other to emphasise the sense of otherness 
that is felt regardless of whether a designer 
is dealing with a single private client, or mul-
tiple heterogeneous publics. In all cases, the 
act of design means encountering complex 
relationships with Others situated outside 
the self. This means that design is inescap-
ably inter-subjective: a dialogue structured 
according to valued relationships between 
participants (both real and imagined).
Mikhail Bakhtin is one of the foremost dia-
logical thinkers alongside Martin Buber and 
Emmanuel Levinas. His work rests on the 
principle that it is impossible to conceive of 
any entity outside of the relations that link it 
to an other; what Todorov (1984: 94) summa-
rised as ‘the dialogical principle.’ Bakhtin’s 
work is of particular relevance to design if we 
understand design to be inter-subjective, for 
his early work amounts to a theory of crea-
tive activity based on alterity, dialogue and 
open-ended processes. At its core is the belief 
that everything that has meaning and sig-
nificance is dialogical, that is, meaning is the 
result of an open-ended dialogue between 
various entities (Bakhtin 1984: 34). Meaning 
and value, in this case, are never given, but 
always worked at through a process of delib-
eration, negotiation, agreement and disa-
greement, changing over time and space.
What the creative act does, according to 
Bakhtin (1993), is turn this dialogue into 
form (turning theory into practice). To act is 
to come out of oneself once and for all, to 
take position vis-à-vis an internal or external 
dialogue and implies the acknowledgement 
of one’s answerability for the action (Bakhtin 
1993: 28). For Bakhtin, every individual occu-
pies a unique position in time and space that 
cannot simultaneously be occupied by some-
body else. That is, one’s actions affirm the 
uniqueness of one’s position in the world, 
a condition Bakhtin refers to as the ‘non-
alibi in Being’ (40). The act therefore holds 
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tremendous importance in this theory of cre-
ative activity because it is the enactment of 
an embodied and valued relationship to the 
Other, and one that makes us answerable for 
our unique positions in the world.
The various methods used to open up 
design to the Other (participation, consulta-
tion, exhibitions, etc.) are ways of addressing 
relationships in the project by giving them 
value. Independent of quality considera-
tions, we understand that a contract between 
designer and client, or a participatory work-
shop with local residents, both contribute to 
the value of the relationships. Furthermore, 
designers are constantly involved in exer-
cises that invent publics and users by put-
ting values on the relationships they have 
with others in the process (whether real or 
imagined). When designers put pen to paper, 
so to speak, and make design decisions, they 
are shaping valued relationships into form 
(a proposal, a strategy, a detail). Designing 
is thus analogous to Bakhtin’s ‘act’. It is an 
enactment of valued relations in the design 
process (between designer and users, clients 
and other stakeholders) and of the unique 
position of the designer in time and space 
with respect to Others.
What Bakhtin’s theory of the act tells us is 
that alterity is a necessary condition of the 
creative process (Bakhtin 1990: 86). As we 
saw, the inter-subjectivity of every act—par-
ticularly every design act—means that no 
creation is possible without dialogue.
Designer and Drawing
As well as thinking about the relationship 
between designers and those they design 
for as a dialogue, it is also possible to under-
stand the activity of designing (manifest in 
actions such as drawing and sketching) in 
similar terms. An analogy between design 
and conversation has been suggested by 
Cross (2007), Gedenryd (1998), Goldschmidt 
(1991) and Schön, who referred to design as 
a ‘reflective conversation with the situation’ 
(1991: 76).3 One way in which this analogy 
can be substantiated is via the understanding 
of circularity in cybernetics (see for instance 
Glanville 2007, 2009; Krippendorff, 2007). 
Cybernetics is a discipline concerned with 
circular interaction and feedback and so with 
the structure of dialogue or conversation—
especially in Pask’s (1976) Conversation 
Theory and in von Foerster’s (1991, 1992, 
2003) cybernetic approach to ethics. This 
shared interest makes comparisons with 
Bakhtin possible, as have been suggested by 
Krippendorff (1996).
Drawing particularly on Pask’s (1976) 
Conversation Theory, Glanville (2007) shows 
how the circularity of conversation is simi-
lar in structure to designing – particularly 
with regard to one of the most characteris-
tic component activity of designing, sketch-
ing.4 While many insights about design can 
be gained from this analogy between design 
and conversation (see for instance Glanville 
2007 and Gedenryd 1998), our aim in this 
section is to describe design’s implicitly dia-
logical structure. In doing so, we suggest 
there is a deep reciprocity between design 
activity and the wider dialogues in which 
designers participate.
It is a premise of Conversation Theory that 
meaning cannot be transferred from one par-
ticipant to another.5 Given this, the question 
arises how it is possible for us to communi-
cate stable meanings with one another as we 
evidently can do. This can be explained in 
terms of the circular feedback (that is, cyber-
netic) mechanisms that occur in conversa-
tion. When participating in conversation we 
compare the meaning that we try to commu-
nicate with what we understand other par-
ticipants have understood in terms of what 
they say back to us. If these two meanings 
(what I meant to communicate; what I under-
stand the other to have understood) are close 
then we can be satisfied that we have been 
understood well enough to continue. If the 
meanings are divergent, we can offer further 
clarification or explain ourselves in differ-
ent ways, and again compare what we mean 
to say with what we understand has been 
understood. We can keep repeating this pro-
cess in order to bring these two meanings 
closer together (see similarly von Foerster, 
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1991: 72–73, 2003) – or, alternatively, until 
we agree to disagree (Pask, 1988: 55). In the 
cybernetic understanding of conversation, 
our communication takes the recursive form 
‘what I think of what you think I think, etc.’ 
(Glanville, 1993: 217) allowing us to share 
ideas with each other while our understand-
ings remain independent (there is no trans-
ference of meaning; we do not need to know 
for sure what the other thinks).
The mechanism of conversation is more 
than just a way of communicating static 
meaning – it is also a generative process that 
helps us invent new understandings and 
improve existing ones through interaction 
with others. This is most obvious in the way 
we learn from the ideas which others present 
to us and from their comments on, and criti-
cisms of, our own thoughts, which prompt 
us to revise our thinking. As well as this, we 
also learn through this interaction where we 
discover what our own ideas imply by seeing 
how they are interpreted by others or where 
we sometimes learn through misunderstand-
ing where others see a worthwhile idea in 
what we say which we had not intended.
The activity of designing is, similarly to a 
conversation, a circular process of feedback. 
While this can be seen to work at different 
scales throughout design, it is particularly 
evident in sketching where the feedback is 
most immediate. In sketching the designer 
simultaneously plays role of speaker and 
listener, switching roles between the two 
while evaluating and drawing at the same 
time.6 This process is also present in the 
more long term tasks of the design process, 
such as developing different iterations of 
a scheme, but in a more clearly sequential 
manner. Similarly to a conversation, the 
circularity of design enables both the pur-
suit of stability and also the generation 
of new ideas and goals. In sketching, the 
designer needs to continually invent new 
understandings at every turn (continually 
constructing possible ways of interpreting 
the sketch), receives feedback about an idea 
through its exploration (in the same way 
that we learn from the other) and finds new 
ideas in a drawing even when not intended 
(in the same way that in a conversation a 
misunderstanding can sometimes offer 
new possibilities). While in one sense the 
feedback process of sketching allows us to 
pursue a particular idea, as with conversa-
tion, this idea is not fixed at the outset but 
is developed through the process. In trying 
to achieve some idea, we revise not just the 
attempt to fulfil it but also the idea itself, 
having learnt more about it and the situ-
ation, just as the nature and content of a 
conversation changes during its course. 
Designers in this sense do not solve prob-
lems but invent them, exploring the situa-
tion through making proposals.7
Drawings play an important role in ena-
bling a dialogue between designers and 
users, opening up the project so that it can 
be commented on. The value of drawing for 
designers, however, is not just as a means 
of communicating ideas or of enabling oth-
ers to participate in the design process but, 
also, in sustaining designers’ own internal 
dialogues. Sketching is like a conversation 
whereby the designer simultaneously plays 
both the roles of speaker and listener. The 
designer anticipates the Other by ‘walking 
through’ the plans, etc., using drawings (and 
the activity of drawing) to imagine how the 
proposal would be experienced in the posi-
tion of the other – in a comparable sense to 
what von Foerster calls seeing ‘through the 
eyes of the Other’ and which he connects to 
ethics (1991, 2007: 267). This ‘Othering’ of 
the self, made possible by working through 
a medium such as when sketching, is impor-
tant not just, ethically, in terms of con-
sidering others in the process but also for 
designers’ own exploration of the complex 
situations which they typically encounter.8 
That is, dialogue with Others is not solely 
a participatory exercise to be added onto 
design but integral to it (and more generally 
how one acts in the world). It is only by look-
ing ‘through the eyes of the Other’ that one 
sees what one has done and what this means.
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Design and Dialogue
The preceding two sections were founded 
on two different premises, the first on the 
inter-subjective nature of existence and the 
second on the circular structure of drawing. 
Still, both sections offer similar conclusions: 
all modes of design (from sketching to par-
ticipatory methods) are modes of relating 
to Others; the nature of this relation is dia-
logical (it is not fixed, but open-ended); and 
finally, every design act involves (at some 
point) occupying a position outside the self. 
Our goal in the final part of this article is to 
develop these ideas through setting them up 
in conversation, so to speak. Our aim is to 
show that one crucial predication of under-
standing design as dialogue is through the 
reciprocity, and mutual equivalence, of the 
ethical and the aesthetic.
Our work has demonstrated that in either 
the context of the relation between designer 
and drawing, or between designer and Other, 
the process of designing is both ethical 
and aesthetic. Design’s dialogical structure 
incorporates ethical and aesthetic considera-
tions in its internal processes, such as draw-
ing, and its outward looking ones, such as 
engagement with others. Ethical and aes-
thetic issues are connected in two ways. First, 
a connection arises in the act of designing, as 
the process involves the consideration of per-
ceivable properties (aesthetics) and of other 
people (ethics). Second, there are ethical and 
aesthetic connections in the structure of 
dialogue: while our ethical relation with the 
Other is enacted in conversation, this process 
presupposes an aesthetic relation, whether 
between designer and drawing or designer 
and another person.
The importance of occupying a position 
outside the self in dialogue stems from our 
spatial embodiment in the world—we exist 
as unique observers in the world and this 
uniqueness means we can never see ourselves 
completely (Todorov 1984: 95). However, 
this means that I see things that others can-
not, what Bakhtin expresses as the ‘excess 
of seeing’ (1990: 22). This excess is what I 
give to the Other and what the Other gives 
to me so that we may temporarily create a 
more holistic—although unavoidably still 
incomplete—vision of the self. This occurs in 
conversation by enabling participants to see 
both the topic and themselves from different 
perspectives—we see ourselves as situated in 
the world by understanding how someone 
else has understood us.
In both dialogism and cybernetics then, a 
crucial aspect of dialogue is that it enables 
us to see ourselves from other points of view, 
whether in conversation, via the drawing, or 
in the empathy of anticipating the Other. 
Yet in both cases, the experience of a posi-
tion outside the self is always followed by a 
return to the self. For Bakhtin, this return is 
the beginning of aesthetic activity and sup-
ports any act of authorship, hence the neces-
sity for, and the inevitable presence of, the 
Other in creative acts (1990: 25). This double 
movement of departure and return is under-
stood by cybernetics in terms of circularity, 
as feedback connections such as those in a 
conversation between the self and others. In 
the activity of drawing, it is the medium that 
supports outside-ness and conversation: it is 
because one experiences the drawing that 
one can judge how to improve it.
The double movement (or circularity) of 
aesthetic activity is a foundation for ethics in 
both dialogic (Gardiner 1996, Murray 2000, 
Nealon 1997) and cybernetic thought (von 
Foerster 1991, 2003; Glanville 2004). The 
dialogue of positioning and re-positioning 
one’s actions (in cybernetic terms: feedback) 
both connects us with, and is our primary 
mode of relating to, the Other. Responsible 
(or answerable) evaluation and action can-
not meaningfully be separated from our 
perception of the world, or, in other words, 
the ethical cannot be separated from the 
aesthetic. They are joined in dialogue; first 
because deliberation and values are enacted 
in dialogue through perceivable actions, and 
second, because aesthetics is the foundation 
of embodied relations to Others in the world. 
It follows from understanding design as 
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dialogue that neither ethical judgement nor 
aesthetic considerations can be isolated. The 
designer’s responsibilities are tied to both 
ethics and aesthetics, and are furthermore 
implied in actions that affirm the designer’s 
unique position in the world. Therefore, in 
the same way that there can be no alibi in 
Being, there can be no alibi in designing.
We can see in both the examples discussed 
above (the dialogical relations between 
the designer and the drawing, and those 
between the designer and the Other) an 
understanding of ethics as being concerned 
with processes, rather than with particular 
solutions. Given this, a critical question is 
not how a particular conversation can be 
resolved, but how it can be maintained in 
such a way that it is productive. In writing 
this paper, we found the most productive 
moments were those when, after going over 
a few drafts, we found passages that were 
neither fully one or other of ours, something 
that challenged both our initial positions 
and the development of our ideas. This dis-
covery supported the necessity for captur-
ing the productive uncertainty intrinsic to 
dialogical processes, for it is the quality of 
dialogue that matters more than its acknowl-
edgment. In this sense, focusing on dia-
logical processes and allowing unexpected 
development and outcomes works to rein-
force the critique of systemic or structural 
approaches that leave no room for either 
doubt or response. Thinking about design 
in this way means a shift of emphasis from 
the application of given tools, the following 
of strict guidelines or the entrenchment in 
absolute positions, to negotiation and delib-
eration about what might constitute ‘good’ 
design in varying contexts. Indeed, what is 
appropriate to one situation may not be for 
the next. Diminishing aesthetic concerns in 
order to emphasise an ethical design pro-
cess is as problematic as negating the sig-
nificance of Others in order to emphasise 
aesthetic coherence or individual genius. 
Controversial calls for ‘less aesthetics, more 
ethics’ are equally problematic, then, as calls 
for ‘more aesthetics, less ethics’.9
Notes
 1 On the responsibility of authority implied 
in any instance of doing ethics, see 
Somerville (2009: 4–5).
 2 Research in urban design is supported by 
an in-depth investigation of the recent 
Barking Town Square in East London. 
The Town Square, completed in 2010, is a 
mixed-use project in the London Borough 
of Barking and Dagenham with build-
ings by AHMM and public space by muf 
architecture/art. The latter is recognised, 
significantly for our research, in terms of 
its dialogical approach to social engage-
ment in urban design, which mixes pub-
lic art practice with architectural practice. 
Although comments in this paper are 
supported by three years of research, 
including extensive fieldwork in Barking, 
there is unfortunately no space to expand 
on this evidence. For further elaboration 
see Kenniff (2011, 2012).
 3 The process described by Goldschmidt 
(1991) as dialectic is, in terms of our argu-
ment in this article, better understood as 
dialogue.
 4 Sketching is also the most prominent 
example taken by Gedenryd (1998), 
Goldschmidt (1991) and Schön (1991) in 
describing the epistemology of design in 
terms of conversation. It is a microcosm 
of the design process as a whole.
 5 For a fuller account of Conversation 
Theory than is possible here, see Barnes 
(2007), Glanville (1993), Glanville and 
Müller (2007) and Scott (2001, 2007).
 6 In Pask’s Conversation Theory (1976) a 
distinction is drawn between the par-
ticipants in a conversation (psycholog-
ical-individuals) and their embodiment 
(mechanical-individuals). These distinc-
tions are not necessarily in a one-to-one 
correspondence and thus I, for exam-
ple, can play the role of several partici-
pants in dialogue with myself, as in the 
example of drawing. Similarly, dialogue 
in Bakhtin does not necessarily mean 
another human being is present. Conver-
sation can happen between a designer 
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and imagined users, which means there 
is only one human. Dialogic relations, 
Bakhtin contends, are present in every-
thing, even monologues (Bakhtin 1986, 
also Casarino and Negri 2008). The inter-
subjectivity inherent to dialogism is the 
acknowledgement of the alterity that 
characterises each person in becoming. 
 7 Lawson’s (1979) studies show how in 
problem solving situations designers 
focus on proposing potential solutions 
rather than, as scientists, on analysing 
the problem. Designers explore the situ-
ation through making proposals. See also 
Cross (2007: 36–37). 
 8 On the importance of working through a 
medium to the way designers think, see, 
for instance, Gedenryd, 1998 and Sweet-
ing, 2011.
 9 ‘Less Aesthetics, More Ethics’ was the 
title given to the 2000 Venice Architec-
ture Biennale by its director Massimiliano 
Fuksas (see Leach 2005).
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